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I. INTRODUCTION 
As companies that operate in the healthcare industry increasingly conduct 
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Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or Act),1 which prohibits payments or offers to 
pay anything of value to a foreign official in order to obtain or retain business. 
The pattern of FCPA enforcement actions brought by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against entities in 
the healthcare industry over the last decade demonstrates the industry-specific 
challenges of compliance as well as the harsh sanctions faced by companies and 
individuals that violate the FCPA, including high fines, bad press, legal fees, 
and the possibility of a negative impact on stocks or profits.  
Particularly in the healthcare sphere, violations of the FCPA result in 
adverse consequences for patients who require medical services in the locations 
where violations take place. First, patients are adversely impacted because 
healthcare entities that pay bribes to foreign officials in order to secure a 
business advantage hamper competition by precluding stakeholders from 
competing to provide optimal healthcare services and products to patients at the 
most competitive prices. Second, illegal payments made to healthcare 
professionals in order to favor a particular treatment option create a de facto 
conflict of interest that adversely impacts healthcare professionals’ ability to 
make medical decisions in the best interest of their patients. When healthcare 
companies violate the FCPA, the ultimate result is ironic—entities that stand to 
profit by improving outcomes for patients actually harm patients. As a result, it 
is particularly important for companies operating globally in the healthcare 
industry to institute robust anti-bribery compliance programs.  
This Essay begins by highlighting the most important provisions of the 
FCPA. Then, this Essay presents summaries of FCPA enforcement actions in 
the healthcare industry over the last decade to demonstrate the healthcare-
specific challenges of compliance and the sanctions that have been imposed. 
Ultimately, this Essay argues that, in addition to the sanctions that all violators 
of the FCPA face, violations of the FCPA in the healthcare industry also 
adversely impact patients by depriving them of optimal medical services at the 
best prices, and causing the medical advice of healthcare professionals to be 
tainted by conflicts of interest. As a result, it is particularly important for 
companies operating in the global healthcare sphere to establish and implement 
robust compliance programs that incorporate methods of dealing with industry-
specific FCPA risks. 
                                                                                                                       
 1 The FCPA amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 
881. The FCPA underwent amendments itself in 1988 and 1998. See Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, amended by Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, subtit. A, pt. 1, 102 Stat. 
1415 and by International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)  




II. BACKGROUND: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
In general, the FCPA prohibits: (1) the payment or offer to pay 
anything of value to a foreign official to obtain or retain business (anti-
bribery provisions);2 and (2) the inadequate keeping of books, records, 
and accounts (books and records and internal controls provisions).3 
Violators of the FCPA face significant penalties.4 The United States can 
raise civil5 and criminal6 claims against those who face FCPA 
enforcement action, as well as suspend or revoke the benefits of 
conducting business in the United States.7  
                                                                                                                       
 2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1)–(2), 78dd-2(a)(1)–(2), 78dd-3(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 3 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A). The FCPA does not expressly define what it means to pay 
“anything of value” to a government official, although the phrase has been interpreted 
broadly. The legislative history surrounding the phrase “anything of value” is not 
particularly helpful. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-831 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). The books and records 
and internal controls provisions of the FCPA deter companies from making corrupt 
payments by requiring companies to maintain accurate corporate books. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78m(b)(2)(A) (2006). The law anticipates that corrupt payments may be logged as ordinary 
expenditures to give the false impression that a payment was intended for some legitimate 
expense. 
 4 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries 
Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in 
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html. 
 5 The FCPA provides for civil penalties of up to $10,000 for violations of the anti-
bribery provisions, and the Attorney General may file a civil injunction action to enjoin a 
domestic concern from violating the FCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(B) (2006) (civil 
penalties for violations by issuers); id. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(B) (individual civil penalties against 
domestic concerns); id. § 78dd-2(d)(1) (permanent injunction or temporary restraining order 
are available). 
 6 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006) (stating penalties for violations of the FCPA). Corporations 
that violate the statute may face a criminal fine of up to $2 million per violation of the books 
and records and internal controls provisions, or twice the bribe paid or benefit sought or 
received (whichever is greater) for violations of the anti-bribery provisions. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3571(d) (2006); see also, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Micrus Corporation 
Enters into Agreement to Resolve Potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Liability (Mar. 2, 
2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/March/05_crm_090.htm 
(announcing that Micrus entered into a deferred prosecution agreement to pay $450,000 in 
penalties and establish a FCPA compliance program). Corporations that willfully violate the 
books and records and internal controls provisions can be punished with a criminal fine of 
up to $25 million. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006).  
 7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FIGHTING GLOBAL CORRUPTION: BUSINESS RISK MANAGEMENT 
28 (2001) (“The President has directed that no executive agency shall allow any party to 
participate in any procurement or nonprocurement activity if any agency has debarred, 
suspended, or otherwise excluded that party from participation in a procurement or 
nonprocurement activity.”). The SEC and DOJ also can seek disgorgement of profits. For 
example, Titan Corporation paid a fine of $28.5 million, $15.5 million of which was in 




Especially relevant to the healthcare industry, under the FCPA, the 
definition of “foreign official” includes traditional government 
employees as well as “instrumentalit[ies] thereof.”8 In June 2008, AGA 
Medical Corporation, a privately held Minnesota company, settled FCPA 
charges for using a Chinese distributor to make improper payments to 
doctors employed by Chinese government-owned or government-
controlled hospitals in exchange for the doctors’ purchase of AGA’s 
medical products.9 Thus, doctors and other employees of government-
owned or government-controlled healthcare entities are considered 
“instrumentalit[ies] thereof.” 
Despite these restrictions, the FCPA expressly permits “facilitating” 
or “expediting” payments made to foreign officials, so long as no 
payments made to a foreign official are used to encourage that official to 
award new business or to continue business with a particular party.10 The 
1988 amendments to the FCPA created two previously unavailable 
affirmative defenses: (1) the “local law” defense11 and (2) the 
“reasonable and bona fide expenditure” defense.12 The availability of the 
“reasonable and bona fide expenditure” defense is limited to defendants 
who can prove that the expenditures lacked a corrupt purpose.13 These 
defenses are of little use when corrupt bribes are made to a foreign 
official to secure favorable action, which the pattern of enforcement of 
the FCPA in the healthcare industry illustrates.14 
                                                                                                                       
disgorgement, for making improper payments to a foreign official in Benin. Litigation 
Release No. 19107, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Sues the Titan Corporation for 
Payments to Election Campaign of Benin President (Mar. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19107.htm. 
 8 See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its 
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 391–92 (2010). 
 9 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, AGA Medical Corporation Agrees to Pay 
$2 Million Penalty and Enter Deferred Prosecution Agreement for FCPA Violations (June 3, 
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-crm-491.html. 
 10 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2006). 
 11 The narrow “local law” defense allows a “payment, gift, offer, or promise of 
anything of value” to a foreign official, so long as the payment is in accordance with the 
written laws of the country in which it occurred. Id. § 78dd-1(c)(1). 
 12 The “reasonable and bona fide expenditure” defense allows for a “payment, gift, 
offer, or promise of anything of value” that is considered a “reasonable and bona fide 
expenditure.” Id. § 78dd-1(c)(2)(A)–(B).  
 13 See id. A payment that is a reasonable and bona fide expenditure and directly relates 
to the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services, or directly relates to 
the execution or performance of a contract is not prohibited. Id.  
 14 For a criticism of the effectiveness of these defenses, see generally Kyle P. Sheahen, 
I’m Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 464 (2010). 




III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY 
In the last decade, there has been a surge in FCPA enforcement, 
especially in the healthcare sector.15 As healthcare entities gain or seek to 
gain access to overseas markets, they must model their business 
strategies and compliance programs to avoid the risk of violating the 
FCPA.16 The most significant challenges of compliance with the FCPA in 
the healthcare industry arise out of the fact that many foreign hospitals, 
clinics, laboratories, and medical providers are state-owned or state-
controlled, which sweeps them into the FCPA’s jurisdictional reach.  
The following summaries of FCPA enforcement actions illustrate 
healthcare industry-specific FCPA risks and sanctions. With regard to the 
negative consequences for patients, violations of the FCPA in the 
healthcare industry typically occur when bribes are paid: (1) to an 
influential foreign official in order to secure access to an investment, thus 
stifling competition; or (2) to a healthcare professional in order to induce 
the professional to favor the company’s products, thus creating a conflict 
of interest. 
A. Syncor: December 2002 
Syncor International Corporation (Syncor), a company that sells and 
distributes radiopharmaceutical products, settled an SEC enforcement 
action that alleged that the company’s subsidiaries in Taiwan, Mexico, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and France made payments to doctors and 
hospitals to influence purchasing decisions.17 The SEC found that Syncor 
employees made commissions and other payments in the form of cash, 
improper referral fees, personal loans, over-invoicing arrangements, 
sponsorship to seminars, and gifts in return for referrals and sales of 
Syncor products. The company consented to the entry of a final judgment 
                                                                                                                       
 15 See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).  
 16 See James A. Barta & Julia Chapman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 825, 855–58 (2012). 
 17 Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., No. 02-CR-1244-SVW 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ 
fraud/fcpa/cases/syncor-taiwan/12-03-02syncor-taiwan-plea-agree.pdf. Syncor Taiwan was 
the target of DOJ’s investigation and the only Syncor entity to also plead guilty to criminal 
charges for paying “commissions” to physicians of state-owned hospitals. The commissions 
were paid in return for the purchase and sale of unit dosages of certain radiopharmaceuticals 
and for referrals of patients to medical imaging centers owned by Syncor Taiwan. Id. at 21–
23. 




with the SEC without admitting or denying the charges, and paid a 
$500,000 civil penalty.18 Syncor’s Taiwan subsidiary plead guilty to DOJ 
criminal charges and was fined $2 million.19 This was the first case 
where the government charged a company for bribing doctors considered 
to be foreign officials or “instrumentalit[ies] thereof,” which opened the 
door for similar future prosecutions. 
B. Schering-Plough: June 2004 
Schering-Plough Corporation (Schering), a global pharmaceutical 
company, allegedly made improper payments through its foreign 
subsidiary to a charitable foundation in Poland, in order to induce a 
public official to exert influence over government funds to purchase 
Schering products.20 The founder and president of the charitable 
foundation was also the director of a government health authority in 
Poland that provided money to purchase pharmaceutical products and 
influenced the purchase of those products by entities such as hospitals. 
Although recorded as donations, the SEC found that the director 
subjectively valued donations to the bona-fide charity and Schering 
provided the intangible benefit to bribe the public official.21 Without 
admitting or denying the allegations, Schering consented to a $500,000 
civil penalty.22 This was the first instance when a company’s charitable 
contribution was considered to be “anything of value,” further expanding 
the scope of improper payments under the FCPA. 
                                                                                                                       
 18 Consent of Defendant at 1, SEC v. Syncor Int’l, Inc., No. 1:02CV02421 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 10 2002), available at http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/ 
7e8/7e8346944579a0844a8fd30f9fa27c45.pdf?i=fa67e6df39b7d75e6307cc22a271c378.  
 19 Plea Agreement, supra note 17, at 5. In 2007, six years after Syncor settled with DOJ 
and the SEC, the SEC brought a civil case against Monty Fu, the chairman of Syncor Taiwan 
and Syncor International. The complaint alleged that Fu was responsible for ensuring 
compliance with the books-and-records and internal accounting controls provisions of the 
FCPA and that he was aware that Syncor Taiwan was making corrupt payments to doctors 
and hospitals. Fu consented to the entry of a final judgment and to a $75,000 penalty. See 
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files Settled Books and Records and 
Internal Accounting Controls Charges Against Former Chairman of Syncor International 
Corp. (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2007/lr20310.htm.  
 20 Complaint at 2–13, SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 04-0945 (D.D.C. June 9, 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18740.pdf.  
 21 Id. at 9. 
 22 SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 04-0945 (D.D.C. June 16, 2004), available at 
http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/d0d/d0d468cbae3eda3d39ed1c5467d24fc4.pdf?i=fe3d8c1a91
4ffbb7c23b1b024154131c (order granting entry of final judgment). 




C. HealthSouth: July 2004 
DOJ indicted former executives of HealthSouth Corporation 
(HealthSouth), a provider of outpatient surgery, diagnostic imaging, and 
rehabilitative healthcare services. Allegedly, the former President and 
CEO of the In-Patient Division and the former Vice President of Legal 
Services made and authorized corrupt payments to the director of a Saudi 
Arabian foundation in order to secure business for HealthSouth.23 The 
Saudi foundation was a private nonprofit organization funded by 
members of the Saudi Royal Family. DOJ alleged that the executives 
provided corrupt payments to the foundation’s director in order to secure 
HealthSouth staffing and management services at a hospital in Saudi 
Arabia.24 To conceal the scheme, the defendants allegedly arranged a 
sham consulting contract between the director and a HealthSouth-
affiliated entity in Australia. Notably, the defendants were acquitted 
following trial in May 2005.25 
D. Micrus: February 2005 
Micrus Corporation (“Micrus”), a company that makes and sells 
medical devices known as embolic coils, entered into a non-prosecution 
agreement under which it accepted responsibility for promising to pay or 
for paying doctors money or objects of value at public hospitals in 
France, Turkey, Spain, and Germany in order to influence them to 
purchase Micrus embolic coils.26 Micrus also paid doctors without 
                                                                                                                       
 23 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former HealthSouth Officers Indicted in 
Connection with Bribery Involving Saudi Hospital (July 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04_crm_463.htm. The U.S. Attorney’s Office of 
the Northern District of Alabama and DOJ indicted HealthSouth employees for conspiracy, 
violations of the FCPA, and violations of the Travel Act.  
 24 Superseding Indictment at 7, United States v. Thompson & Reilly, No. CR-04-J-
0240-S (N.D. Ala. July 28, 2004), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/thomsonr/07-28-04thomson-supersed-
indict.pdf. A licensed attorney allegedly prepared the fake contract. Under the agreement, 
HealthSouth was to receive $10 million annually over a five-year term and the director was 
to be paid $500,000 per year for a five-year period. The bribe was disguised as a “finder’s 
fee.” See Press Release, supra note 23.  
 25 United States v. Thompson & Reilly, No. CR-04-J-240-S, (N.D. Ala. May 20, 2005), 
available at http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/1dd/1dd0ce4f6addbac340d59e37e33a86fb.pdf?i 
=10d1bd8507c5dd935f5a25e64b99cfea.  
 26 See Plea Agreement at App. A, United States v. Micrus Corp., (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 
2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/micrus-corp/02-28-
05micrus-agree.pdf.  




obtaining proper administrative or legal approval required under foreign 
jurisdictions. The scheme involved Micrus providing compensation to 
doctors exceeding the value of the services performed as consultants or 
advisory board members to Micrus. Under the agreement with DOJ, 
Micrus agreed to pay a civil penalty of $450,000.27 
E. Diagnostic Product Corporation: May 2005 
Diagnostic Product Corporation (DPC), a company that develops and 
manufactures medical diagnostic test systems and related kits, settled 
enforcement actions after its subsidiary, Tianjin DePu Biotechnological 
and Medical Products Inc. (DePu), allegedly made improper commission 
payments to doctors and laboratory employees who controlled 
purchasing decisions at Chinese state-owned hospitals.28 The 
commissions represented a certain percentage of sales to the hospitals. 
Without admitting or denying the allegations, DPC agreed to an SEC 
sanction of nearly $2.8 million; DPC also plead guilty to DOJ charges 
and agreed to pay a fine of approximately $2 million.29 
F. Immucor: September 2007 
Immucor, Inc. (Immucor), a medical equipment company 
specializing in the manufacturing and marketing of products used in the 
pre-transfusion diagnostics of human blood, allegedly paid the director of 
an Italian public hospital cash in order to influence his decision to award 
Immucor a contract with a government hospital.30 Immucor’s President 
and CEO, Gioacchino De Chirico, also allegedly agreed to compensate 
the hospital director for his role at a medical conference that discussed an 
Immucor product. Immucor’s German subsidiary made payments to the 
                                                                                                                       
 27 Id. at 2. 
 28 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, DPC (Tianjin) Ltd. Charged with Violating the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (May 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/May/05_crm_282.htm. DePu allegedly made 
commission payments totaling $1.6 million to foreign officials. Although DePu’s 
management knew about, approved, and administered the payments, once DPC learned 
about the improper transactions, it instructed DePu management to cease all of its corrupt 
activities. Id.  
 29 Plea Agreement at 5, United States v. DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd., No. 2:05-cr-00482 
(C.D. Cal. May 20, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
fcpa/cases/dpc-tianjin/05-19-05dpc-tianjin-plea-agree.pdf. DPC entered into a plea 
agreement that imposed a criminal fine and five-year probationary period. 
 30 Complaint at 4–7, SEC v. Gioacchino De Chirico, No. 1:07-cv-2367 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 
28, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20316.pdf.  




director’s Swiss bank account and recorded the payments as consulting 
services.31 This compensation scheme enabled the director to avoid 
income tax. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, De 
Chirico agreed to pay a $30,000 civil penalty.32 
G. AGA Medical Corporation: June 2008 
AGA Medical Corporation (AGA), a company that specializes in 
manufacturing products designed to treat congenital heart defects, 
admitted that AGA made corrupt payments to government officials, 
doctors employed by government-owned or government-controlled 
hospitals, via AGA’s Chinese distributor.33 In exchange for payments, 
through kickbacks and commissions, doctors directed the hospitals to 
purchase AGA medical devices. AGA’s Chinese distributor also made 
payments to Chinese officials in order to have patents on several AGA 
products approved. Pursuant to the deferred prosecution agreement with 
DOJ, AGA agreed to pay a $2 million penalty.34 
H. Novo Nordisk: May 2009 
Novo Nordisk (Novo), an international manufacturer of 
pharmaceutical supplies, made improper payments to Iraqi Ministry of 
Health officials in order to secure Novo’s selection as a provider of 
humanitarian aid, such as food and medicine, through the U.N. Oil-for-
Food Program.35 To effectuate its scheme, Novo inflated the contract 
price when submitting bids to the U.N. The company mischaracterized 
                                                                                                                       
 31 Id. at 5. Allegedly, De Chirico authorized Immucor's German subsidiary to make the 
payment to the Swiss account. The subsidiary allegedly recorded the corrupt payments as 
consulting services, which caused the payments to be paid pursuant to a false invoice and 
incorrectly recorded in Immucor’s books and records. Id. at 6. 
 32 Litigation Release No. 20316, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files Action 
Naming Officer of Immucor, Inc., for Violating, and Aiding and Abetting Violations of, 
Books and Records and Internal Control Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act) (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2007/lr20316.htm. 
 33 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at Attachment A, United States v. AGA Medical 
Corp., No. 0:08-cr-00172JMR (D. Minn. June 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/agamedcorp/06-03-08aga-agree.pdf. 
 34 Id. at 6.  
 35 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Novo Nordisk Agrees to Pay $9 Million Fine in 
Connection with Payment of $1.4 Million in Kickbacks Through the United Nations Oil-for-
Food Program (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/May/09-
crm-461.html.  




the improper payments as “after sales services fee[s].” Novo’s Jordanian 
distributor used the extra money to provide kickbacks to Iraqi 
government officials, and in effect, caused U.N. monies to fund the 
corrupt payments. Novo entered into a deferred prosecution agreement 
with DOJ under which it accepted responsibility and agreed to pay a $9 
million fine.36 The SEC also secured a final judgment against Novo for 
approximately $9 million.37 
I. Johnson and Johnson: April 2011 
Johnson and Johnson (J&J), a global pharmaceutical, consumer 
product, and medical device company, voluntarily disclosed that its 
subsidiaries bribed government doctors and pharmacists in various 
European countries with national healthcare systems to prescribe J&J 
drugs and purchase J&J products.38 J&J also paid kickbacks to the Iraqi 
government to illegally obtain business contracts through the U.N. Oil-
for-Food Program. J&J subsidiaries created sham civil contracts, false 
travel invoices, and used cash and travel payments to bribe public 
officials. Ultimately, the company acknowledged responsibility in its 
settlement with DOJ.39 J&J’s aggregate penalty of $70 million was the 
tenth largest FCPA-related fine.40 
                                                                                                                       
 36 Id. 
 37 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files Settled Books and Records 
and Internal Controls Charges Against Novo Nordisk for Improper Payments to Iraq Under 
the U.N. Oil for Food Program (May 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21033.htm. During the time when 
international sanctions on Iraq were high, the U.N. created the Oil-for-Food Program 
(Program), which allowed Iraq to sell its oil for humanitarian purposes. The Program 
required that oil proceeds be deposited in a U.N. escrow account and that the money only be 
used to purchase humanitarian goods and services approved by the U.N. Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement at 11–13, U.S. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, (D.D.C., 2009) (No. 1:09-cr-
00126-RJL), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/nordiskn/05-06-
09novo-agree.pdf.  
 38 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Johnson & Johnson to Pay More Than 
$70 million in Settled FCPA Enforcement Action (Apr. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21922.htm. J&J engaged in corrupt activities 
in Greece, Poland, and Romania. Id. 
 39 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Johnson & Johnson Agrees to Pay $21.4 
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Oil for Food 
Investigations (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-
446.html.  
 40 See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml. In a parallel action, the SEC and DOJ 
alleged that DePuy, through a Greek distributor it later acquired, paid bribes to public 




J. Smith and Nephew: February 2012 
Smith and Nephew, plc (S&N plc), a global medical company that 
sells orthopedic, endoscopy, and wound-care products, conducts business 
through its wholly owned subsidiary Smith and Nephew, Inc. (S&N 
Inc.), a global manufacturer and supplier of orthopedic medical devices.41 
S&N Inc. created false marketing arrangements under which it sold its 
products at full price to its distributor and then paid the distributor a 
discount in the form of a kickback to an offshore shell company, which 
the distributor controlled. The distributor used funds it received as a slush 
fund to provide cash incentives and other things of value to publicly 
employed Greek doctors to provide incentives to purchase S&N 
products. S&N plc entered into a settlement with the SEC and agreed to 
pay $5.4 million;42 S&N Inc. entered into a deferred prosecution 
agreement with DOJ, acknowledged responsibility, and agreed to pay a 
penalty of $16.8 million.43 
K. Biomet: March 2012 
Biomet Inc. (Biomet), a manufacturer and seller of medical devices 
worldwide, admitted that it made direct and indirect corrupt payments to 
publicly employed doctors through its subsidiaries and distributors in 
Argentina, Brazil, Spain, and China to ensure the purchase of Biomet 
medical devices.44 Payments were in the form of kickbacks, cash, and 
                                                                                                                       
doctors in Greece who chose DePuy’s products. J&J entered into a deferred prosecution 
agreement for the DePuy charges, acknowledged wrongdoing, and consented to a $21.4 
million penalty. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. DePuy, Inc., No. 1:11-cr-00099-JBD 
(D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/depuy-
inc/04-08-11depuy-dpa.pdf. 
 41 Complaint at 2–9, SEC v. Smith & Nephew plc, No. 1:12-cv-00187 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22252.pdf. The 
transactions were disguised as commissions and marketing payments to the off-shore shell 
companies on the books and records. Id. at 8. 
 42 SEC v. Smith & Nephew plc, No. 1:12-cv-00187 (GK) (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2012), 
available at http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/66e/66e4575dd7b3239773de2f06a014b493.pdf?i 
=0c3aacbe97d9147d34ee9fc186f81621. 
 43 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 5, United States v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 
1:12-cr-00030-RBW (D.D.C Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smith-nephew/2012-02-01-s-n-dpa.pdf. Among the factors 
considered when entering into the deferred prosecution agreement, DOJ stated that S&N Inc. 
cooperated fully, took remedial measures, and investigated and disclosed its misconduct. Id. 
at 2. 
 44 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 14–20, United States v. Biomet, Inc., No. 1:12-
CR-00080-RBW (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/ 




travel arrangements; sham invoices were used to justify the payments. 
Under the deferred prosecution agreement with DOJ, Biomet agreed to 
pay over $17 million;45 under the SEC settlement Biomet agreed to 
disgorge over $5 million.46 
L. Orthofix: July 2012 
Orthofix International N.V. (Orthofix), a company focused on the 
development, manufacture, and distribution of surgical and non-surgical 
medical devices, allegedly paid bribes to Mexican officials through a 
subsidiary in Mexico in return for a Mexican government social service 
agency and its hospitals’ purchase of Orthofix products.47 Orthofix’s 
subsidiary also agreed to pay Mexican officials a percentage of collected 
sales revenue in order to win the right to sell Orthofix products to two 
Mexican hospitals. The agency created fictitious companies and sent 
invoices to Orthofix after it provided incentives such as cash, laptop 
computers, televisions, and appliances. Under the deferred prosecution 
agreement with DOJ and final judgment with the SEC, which Orthofix 
acknowledged to be true and accurate, the company disgorged $5.2 
million and agreed to a $2.22 million fine.48 
M. Pfizer HCP Corporation: August 2012 
Pfizer Inc. (Pfizer), a global pharmaceutical company, signed a 
deferred prosecution agreement under which it admitted that it bribed 
                                                                                                                       
files/fraud.fcpa.biomet.dpa.pdf. Numerous executives, managers, and auditors, including a 
U.S.-based Senior Vice President, knew of the improper payments. Id. at 15. The bribes 
were recorded as “consulting fees,” “commissions,” “royalties,” and “scientific incentives” 
in Biomet’s books and records. Id.  
 45  Id. at 5. 
 46 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Medical Device Company 
Biomet with Foreign Bribery (Mar. 26, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2012/2012-50.htm. The SEC stated that the government’s proactive investigation of 
bribery within the medical device industry led to the discovery of Biomet’s misconduct. Id.  
 47 Complaint at 3–4, SEC v. Orthofix Int’l N.V., No. 4:12-CV-419 (E.D. Tex. July 10, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22412.pdf. 
Orthofix’s subsidiary falsely recorded the bribe-related expenses on its books and records as 
“promotional expenses,” payments for medical equipment, and training- related expenses. 
Orthofix lacked the proper internal controls to identify this illicit activity and failed to 
implement FCPA compliance programs. Id. at 4–6.  
 48 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Orthofix International with 
FCPA Violations (July 10, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-
133.htm.  




publicly employed regulators and government healthcare professionals, 
including officials in Croatia, Russia, Bulgaria, and Kazakhstan, in 
exchange for regulatory and formulary approvals, sales, and increased 
prescriptions of Pfizer products.49 The government healthcare 
professionals received various things of value, such as travel benefits and 
bonuses based on percentage of sales, in return for the promise to 
purchase Pfizer products, meet a specific targeted Pfizer prescription 
goal, and add Pfizer products to government lists and into bidding. Pfizer 
agreed to pay a $15 million fine. Notably, the SEC separately charged 
Wyeth LLC (Wyeth), a company acquired by Pfizer in 2009, with 
additional FCPA violations.50 Without admitting or denying the 
allegations, Wyeth agreed to a settlement under which it paid a total of 
$18.8 million. 
***** 
While the summaries above focus on prosecutions under the FCPA’s 
anti-bribery provisions, almost all of these enforcement actions also 
included violations under the FCPA’s books and records and internal 
controls provisions.51 For example, Micrus recorded inflated payments to 
doctors as stock options, honorariums, and commissions.52 Similarly, 
Novo recorded corrupt payments to the Iraqi government officials as 
“commissions.”53 The high likelihood that corrupt payments are logged 
as ordinary expenditures to give the false impression that a payment was 
intended for some legitimate expense provides the SEC, which enforces 
                                                                                                                       
 49 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at A-1–A-15, United States v. Pfizer H.C.P. Corp., 
No. 1:12-CR-00169 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/pfizer/2012-08-07-pfizer-dpa.pdf.  
 50 Complaint at 4–9, SEC v. Wyeth LLC, No. 1:12-cv-01304 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-152-wyeth.pdf. 
Following Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth, Pfizer identified potential improper payments. Id. 
at 5. The SEC alleges that Wyeth subsidiaries in China, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Saudi 
Arabia made improper payments to government doctors and other health care professionals 
to receive business. Id. The inaccurate books and records of Wyeth’s subsidiaries were 
consolidated in the financial reports of Wyeth, and Wyeth failed to devise and maintain an 
appropriate system of internal accounting controls. Id. at 9. Certain payments were made 
following Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth without Pfizer’s knowledge. Id. at 2.  
 51 AGA was prosecuted under only the anti-bribery provisions. The following issuers, 
their subsidiaries, or individuals affiliated with the companies were charged with violations 
of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA: (1) Syncor, (2) 
Schering, (3) HealthSouth, (4) Micrus, (5) Diagnostics, (6) Immucor, (7) Novo, (8) J&J, (9) 
S&N plc, (10) Biomet, (11) Orthofix, and (12) Pfizer.  
 52 Plea Agreement at App. A, United States v. Micrus Corp., (Feb. 28, 2005), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/micrus-corp/02-28-05micrus-agree.pdf. 
 53 See supra Part III.H.  




the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA, with 
an avenue to join DOJ in a parallel prosecution.54 Indeed, healthcare 
companies must understand industry-specific vulnerabilities to the FCPA 
in order to prevent possible violations.  
For example, many foreign governments have public healthcare 
systems, which pose unique risks to pharmaceutical, medical device, and 
other healthcare companies. Practices such as paying for a doctor to 
attend a conference with the understanding that the doctor will provide 
some benefit in return may violate the FCPA. Biomet faced an 
enforcement action when it paid traveling expenses for twenty 
government-employed surgeons and recorded them as “consulting 
fees.”55 A substantial portion of the doctors’ visit included sightseeing 
and entertainment at Biomet’s expense.56 The government found that 
Biomet’s intent was to encourage the purchase of Biomet products.57  
Another notable aspect regarding the enforcement of the FCPA in the 
healthcare sector is that over half of the cases summarized above involve 
a government-employed healthcare professional as the recipient of a 
corrupt payment.58 For example, Syncor provided cash, improper referral 
fees, personal loans, etc., to government doctors in return for referrals 
and sales of Syncor products.59 Also, DePu made illegal commission 
payments to doctors and laboratory employees who controlled 
purchasing decisions at Chinese state-owned hospitals.60 Other 
enforcement actions involve government-affiliated hospital executives 
with influence over purchasing decisions. For example, Schering’s 
donations to a nonprofit organization were deemed corrupt when the 
                                                                                                                       
 54 Notably, while the corrupt payments in the enforcement actions described above 
were often recorded as travel, marketing, promotional expenses, or consulting fees, the 
Schering action was unique in that the SEC also found Schering guilty of books and records 
violations after it recorded payments to a bona-fide charity as “donations.” 
 55 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 20, United States v. Biomet, Inc., No. 1:12-CR-
00080-RBW (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/ 
fraud.fcpa.biomet.dpa.pdf. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 16–18. 
 58 The following cases involved payments to government-employed healthcare 
professionals: (1) Syncor, (2) Micrus, (3) Diagnostics, (4) AGA, (5) J&J, (6) S&N plc, (7) 
Biomet, and (8) Pfizer. 
 59 Plea Agreement at 4–5, United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., No. 02-CR-1244-SVW 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ 
syncor-taiwan/12-03-02syncor-taiwan-plea-agree.pdf. 
 60 Id. at 2.  




president of the nonprofit was also the director of a government health 
authority that had control over hospital purchasing decisions.61   
For healthcare companies with an international business scope, it is 
especially important to convey to employees, agents, distributors, and 
affiliates the limits of gift-giving. A robust, well-executed, and up-to-date 
FCPA compliance program should be designed in light of the industry-
specific risks discussed above. This is essential not only to decrease the 
liability of a healthcare company, but also to protect the end-users of 
their products—patients, who are often overlooked as the victims of 
FCPA violations.  
IV. CONSEQUENCES FOR PATIENTS 
Violators of the FCPA in the healthcare industry face the same harsh 
sanctions as in other industries such as: negative publicity, statutorily 
imposed penalties, significant legal costs, draining of resources, and 
possible negative impact on share price and profits.62 The often 
overlooked consequence of violating the FCPA in the healthcare sphere 
is the adverse impact on patients who rely on medical services in the 
locations where the violations occur. In order to understand the harm to 
patients, it is important to reiterate that the pattern of FCPA enforcement 
actions in the healthcare industry demonstrates that FCPA violations fit 
into two broad categories. Healthcare entities or their agents provide 
“something of value” either (1) to an influential foreign official in order 
to secure access to an investment opportunity63 or (2) to a healthcare 
professional in order to induce the professional to favor the company’s 
products.64   
With regard to the first category, patients are disadvantaged because 
the bribes stifle competition in the market, preventing patients from 
                                                                                                                       
 61 See supra Part III.B.  
 62 See Barta & Chapman, supra note 16, at 855–56.  
 63 See supra Part III. Illustrations include: (1) Schering making improper payments to a 
charitable foundation associated with a public official in order to induce the official’s 
influence over government funds; (2) HealthSouth making corrupt payments to a 
foundation’s director in order to secure HealthSouth’s staffing and management services at a 
hospital; and (3) Immucor paying cash to the director of a public hospital in order to 
influence his decision to award a contract. 
 64 See supra Part III. Illustrations include: (1) Syncor providing improper payments to 
government doctors in return for referrals and sales of Syncor products; (2) Micrus paying 
government doctors in order to influence their purchase of Micrus embolic coils; and (3) 
DePu making illegal commission payments to doctors and laboratory employees who 
controlled purchasing decisions at government-owned hospitals. 




receiving optimal medical goods and services at the best prices. With 
regard to the second category, patients receive inadequate care when 
bribes are paid to healthcare professionals that create a conflict of interest 
causing healthcare professionals to base clinical decisions on what is best 
for them or a third party rather than on what is best for the patient.  
When healthcare markets are competitive, patients benefit from lower 
costs, better care, and more innovation.65 When a healthcare company or 
its agents bribe foreign public officials, for example, in order to ensure 
that the officials select the company to supply pharmaceutical products or 
medical devices, the company effectively eliminates other competitors 
from the marketplace. Those competitors, however, may provide a better 
product or a lower cost. This ultimately deprives patients of the 
opportunity to have better and cheaper treatment options.66  
Additionally, and of more direct harm to patients, bribes paid to 
healthcare professionals create a conflict of interest that impacts medical 
decision-making. In healthcare, conflicts of interest often arise out of 
financial arrangements, such as reimbursement incentives, investments in 
medical facilities, or gifts from third parties.67 A small gift may be an 
                                                                                                                       
 65 See Value-Based Competition, HARV. BUS. SCH., http://www.hbs.edu/rhc/value.html 
(“Healthy competition is competition to improve value for customers, or the quality of 
products or services relative to their price. . . . Health care competition must be transformed 
to a value-based competition on results. This is the best way, and the only way, to drive 
sustained improvements in quality and efficiency.”); see also Michael F. Cannon, 
Commentary, Real Competition Is The Cure for Health Care, CATO INSTITUTE (Oct. 1, 
2005), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/real-competition-is-cure-health-care 
(“Where real market competition can be found in health care, it drives quality upward and 
prices downward.”). 
 66 It is worth noting that since the FCPA’s enactment, some have perceived that the 
FCPA places American businesses at a disadvantage in the global marketplace because 
bribery is commonplace in many countries. Beverley H. Earle, Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Amendments: The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act’s Focus on Improving 
Investment Opportunities, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 549, 551 (1989). However, it would be 
erroneous, in the present day, to argue that companies prohibited from bribing foreign 
officials are at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace. Internationally, anti-
bribery enforcement has developed a great deal.  See Lauren Ann Ross, Note, Using Foreign 
Relations Law to Limit Extraterritorial Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 
DUKE L.J. 445, 460 (2012) (explaining that “[b]oth developed countries and emerging 
economic powers have adopted antibribery legislation prohibiting payments to foreign 
officials for the purpose of obtaining business”). DOJ and the SEC have also been 
proactively enforcing the FCPA, leading to increased prosecutions, penalties, and voluntary 
disclosures. See generally Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the 
United States and United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sentencing, 76 
MO. L. REV. 415 (2011).  
 67 See generally BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR 
CLINICIANS (Lippincott Williams & Wilkins eds., 3d ed. 2005). 




appropriate and permissible way for business people to demonstrate their 
respect or appreciation for each other, so long as the gift does not 
improperly influence the recipient.68 Gifts of nominal value may include 
company promotional items, and reasonable meals and entertainment 
expenses. Such gifts should be given openly and the recipient must 
properly record the gift. Importantly, a large gift (or several small gifts) 
is more likely to be given with improper purpose as part of a bribe, and is 
therefore impermissible under the FCPA.69   
As a general matter, healthcare professionals must avoid accepting 
improper gifts because they give rise to unnecessary conflicts of interest, 
which may lead to bad outcomes for patients. This is because, first, 
patients and the public may be directly harmed if physicians base clinical 
decisions on what is best for them or a third party rather than on what is 
best for the patient. Second, patients need to rely on the 
recommendations of healthcare professionals because patients lack 
medical expertise—if patients fear that healthcare professionals are not 
acting on their behalf, patients may worry or fail to follow 
recommendations. Finally, the public may be harmed because of an 
increased likelihood that when healthcare professionals make decisions 
based on their own interest, in the aggregate, such medical decisions will 
harm entire populations. While doctors may be able to avoid conflicts of 
interest by taking precautions such as properly disclosing their financial 
                                                                                                                       
 68 CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 15 
(2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/29520121114101438198031.pdf. 
 69 Id. In the United States, in order to avoid crossing the fine line between gifts and 
bribes, several pharmaceutical companies have voluntarily implemented strict corporate 
guidelines to regulate their marketing activities. See Natasha Singer, No Mug? Drug Makers 
Cut Out Goodies for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/31/business/31drug.html?_r=1&. Such guidelines may 
require meals provided in connection with informational presentations or discussions to be 
modest, unrelated to entertainment or recreation, and conducive to informational 
communication in office or hospital settings. PHARMA, CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH 
HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/108/phrma_marketing_code_2008.pdf. They may 
also prohibit entertainment and recreational expenses, and non-educational items of minimal 
value, such as pens, notepads, and mugs. Id. at 11. Some suggest that government regulation, 
in addition to self-regulation, is necessary to reduce the improper influence of gifts in the 
pharmaceutical industry. David Grande, Limiting the Influence of Pharmaceutical Industry 
Gifts on Physicians: Self-Regulation or Government Intervention?, J. GEN. INTERNAL MED., 
Jan. 2010, at 79, 79–83, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC2811591/. Such self-regulation may include disclosure requirements, limits on the sale 
of physician-prescribing data for marketing purposes, licensure of pharmaceutical sales 
representatives, or an outright ban on gifts. Id. 




relationships with a third party, healthcare professionals should conduct 
their affairs to avoid undue conflicts of interest in order to prioritize their 
patients’ best interests.70  
V. CONCLUSION 
Violations of the FCPA in the healthcare sphere lead to an ironic 
result. The industry that profits when it improves medical solutions, in 
effect, harms those it seeks to help by depriving patients of optimal care 
at competitive prices and by creating conflicts of interest that impede the 
judgment of healthcare professionals. All companies operating in 
international markets, especially in the healthcare industry, stand to gain 
a great deal from a strong FCPA compliance program for their 
employees, agents, distributors, and other business affiliates. 
                                                                                                                       
 70 The OECD recommendations suggest that:  
[A] modern Conflict of Interest policy should seek to strike a balance, by identifying 
risks to the integrity of public organisations and public officials, prohibiting 
unacceptable forms of conflict, managing conflict situations appropriately, making 
public organisations and individual officials aware of the incidence of such conflicts, 
ensuring effective procedures are deployed for the identification, disclosure, 
management, and promotion of the appropriate resolution of conflict of interest 
situations.  
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RECOMMENDATION OF 
THE COUNCIL ON GUIDELINES FOR MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
3 (2003), http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/2957360.pdf. 
